Abstract
In this article I intend to elucidate the meaning of the accusations by the Electorate of Saxony —and others unofficial—, which J. G. Fichte received in the framework of the Atheism Dispute (Atheismusstreit), according to which his idealistic thought was seen as atheistic. In turn, in this context, the philosopher was accused of nihilism and, according to his own reading of the accusations, was branded as a Jacobin-democrat. The aim is to identify in his works —Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794-1795), the first version of his philosophical system, as well as in the Revolutionsschriften (1793-1794) and in the texts he wrote in the context of the Dispute (1798-1799)— those nodes on which the above-mentioned labels are based. In this sphere, reference is also made to his philosophical relationship with F. H. Jacobi, who played a significant role in the sphere of the Dispute. He criticized him and demarcated a dichotomy between his religious thinking and moral-idealism à la Fichte. The purpose of this analysis is to shed light on Fichte’s own ideas, and at the same time to argue that the labels that were given to his person as well as to his philosophy do indeed have a certain basis —even when, at times, Fichte tried to disassociate himself from them. This analysis delineates the metaphysical distinction between an idealistic and a dogmatic philosophy as well as the differences in their practical implications that entail the vindication of idealism as a philosophy of freedom and equality.
Key words: Fichte, Morality, Atheism, Nihilism, Democratism
Lucas Damián Scarfia, Fichte on Trial. The Atheist, the Nihilist, the Democrat